Typical evaluations of the choice of exchange rate regime employ a criterion function that depends on the real performance of the econoir, and they focus on regimes that are expected to last indefinitely. This latter feature Is strongly contradicted by the transitory nature of actual regimes. This paper extends the recent literature on collapses of fixed exchange rate regimes with exogenous real sectors to examine how the predictions of two popular models for the determination of some real economic variables must be modified when agents rationally perceive that the fixed rate regime will be transitory. The models studied are simple stochastic versions of the models In Dornbusch (1976) and Flood and Marion (1982) .
-3--Typical evaluations of the performance of an economy under alternative exchange rate regimes proceed under the assumption that exchange-rate regimes last forever. 1 This assumption is a gross contradiction of the fact that exchange rate regimes are actually quite transitory. Countries never really followed the •rules of the game" .under the Gold Standard, and it evolved into the Gold Exchange Standard. During the Great Depression currencies became inconvertible. The Bretton Woods system was planned as a system of fixed exchange rates, but it was recognized that countries would devalue and revalue their currencies when in "fundamental disequlibrium". Although this term was never formally defined, countries did devalue and revalue their currencies, often by large amounts, during the two decades preceding the breakdown of the system in 1971.
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the determination of real output in two popular models of the open economy accounting explicitly for the transitory nature of fixed exchange rate regimes. Rational agents understand that an exchange-rate regime may be temporary, and they incorporate expectations of the collapse of the regime and its associated capital gains or losses into their behavioral functions. The models we examine are simple stochastic versions of the Dorubush (1976) model of exchange rate dynamics with flexible output and the Flood and Marion (1982) 
model of wage indexatiori
in an open economy. We work with simplified versions of these models since our point is that some of the implications of the models are drastically altered when we allow agents to act on their understanding of regime impermanence. These alterations are robust to more complex versions of the models, but since we are presenting some counterexamples, model complexity only obscures our points. Our work builds on previous research on the temporary nature of government policies including Salant and Henderson (1978) , Krugman (1979) , Flood and Garber (1983, 1984) and Flood and Marion (1983) .
-4-In Section 2 of the paper we develop our version of the Dornbusch model. For some configurations of the model, we demonstrate that the regime of permanently floating exchange rates always produces a higher unconditional variance of output than does a regime of permanently fixed exchange rates.
This result is confirmed when we consider a temporary fixed-rate regime, although we find the disadvantage of a floating-rate regime diminishes as the possibility of an attack on a fixed rate regime rises. This result is an unsurpr1sng extension of the original comparison between fixed and flexible exchange rates. What is surprising to us, however, is that output variance conditional on maintaining a fixed-rate regime which may collapse can be higher than output variance under floating rates. Intuitively, this measure of the conditional variance of real output corresponds to the sample or measured output variance during a fixed exchange rate regime that has not collapsed.
Our examination of the wage indexing model is presented in Section 3. It is well known that optimal wage indexation depends on the stochastic structure of the underlying economy, and a contribution of Flood and Marion (1982) was to demonstrate that the degree of wage indexation would not be invariant to the country's choice of exchange-rate regime. In their analysis, different permanent exchange rate regimes lead to different optimal wage indexing polices, and each policy is a fixed function of the time invariant stochastic structure of the economy. In this paper we discuss fixed exchange rate regimes which may collapse, and we find that the optimal degree of wage indexation is state dependent and thus time varying even though the stochastic structure of the economy is time invariant.
-5-Our results are presented in the next two sections. For each type of model we first examine permanent exchange rate regimes turning then to a characterization of the economy when a fixed exchange rate regime may possibly collapse. In each model we take the domestic credit component of the money supply to be an exogenous process. This creates an inherent tension between the two government policies, the domestic credit process and the fixed exchange rate regime, which is resolved by the collapse of the regime. This appears to capture the actual priorities of governments without modeling the objective function of the monetary and fiscal authorities. Presumably, one reason why the domestic credit process has priority is because of the seignorage gained by the government from printing money.2 Because algebraic complexity quickly renders complex versions of each type of model analytically intractable, we worked with simple stripped down versions of each type of model while attempting to retain the essential economic aspects of the problems. Some of the derivations of various results are presented in a techical appendix to facilitate presentation of the results.
2k. A DORNBUSCH-TYPE MODEL
The original Dornbusch (1976) model depicted a medium-size open economy that was large in the market for goods produced at home and small in world asset markets. The crucial feature of the model was that domestic currency prices of domestic goods were predetermined while the country's exchange rate and other asset prices were currently determined and free to respond to all current shocks. This feature gave rise to the famous overshooting result.
Since home goods prices were predetermined, the immediate response of the exchange rate to a money-market disturbance had to be larger than that response would have been had all prices been free to adjust. We use a version of the model that makes output demand determined. It consists of the following relations: Equation (1) is money market equilibrium. The logarithm of the real money supply, mt -ht, equals the demand for real money balances, -ni + Ydt.3
The demand for money depends negatively on the opportunity cost of holding money, the nominal interest rate, and it depends positively on the real demand for home goods, d. The equilibrium condition for the world capital market is given in equation (2) by the uncovered interest rate parity condition. The demand for domestic output is specified in equation (3). Demand for home goods depends negatively on the logarithm of the relative price of home goods in terms of foreign goods, ht -(h + St), and Ut is a stochastic demand disturbance. Equation (4) states that ht is set at time t-1 at the level that is expected to clear the market for domestic goods by equating expected demand to full employment output, y.
Actual output in period t is determined by the demand for it given the predetermined variables h and h. The composition of the money supply is given by equation ( Et_x is the mathematical expectation of x conditional on information from date t -j, j = 0, 1. It is assumed that u and Vt are mutually and serially uncorrelated with Et_iUt = Et_ivt = 0 and with constant variances and o.
The foreign price and foreign interest rate are also exogenous stochastic processes. We assume that h = hr_i + z1 where z1 is serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with the model's other disturbances.
Its variance is and it is an element of the time t-1 information set.
This dating convention recognizes that foreign price setters are also setting prices for period t at time t-1. The foreign nominal interest rate, i = i + is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean i. The innovation In the foreign interest rate, x, is assumed to be orthogonal to the other stochastic processes and to have a constant variance Our comparison of alternative exchange rate regimes focuses on the variability of real output. For the permanent regimes we measure variability with the conditional variance V_i(yt) = E1(y -E_iy)2. For the collapsing fixed rate regime we use this measure as well as an alternative.
In all regimes = Et_ldt, and in order to simplify the presentation, we normalized y = Eid = 0, Consequently, the conditional variance of output is Ei(d) = V1(s) + + 2Ci(s;u) (7) where Ci(.;.) denotes the conditional covariance 'perator.
-9-2B.
SOLUTIONS FOR PERMANENT EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
When exchange rates are perfectly flexible, there is rio intervention in the foreign exchange market implying that rt is the constant . A solution for the exchange rate can be found by recognizing that the variables on the right-hand side of (8) completely describe the current state of the system.
Consequently, the linearity of the model allows us to apply the method of undetermined coefficients, and we find + A1h If the exchange rate is permanently fixed at a level s and the government runs an exogenous domestic credit process, then rt becomes endogenous.
International reserves adjust during the period to equate the demand for money and the supply of money. Under a permanently fixed exchange rate regime, s = for all t, and the conditional variance of output is simply v_i(y)ipi = (10) By comparing (9) and (10), one sees that the conditional variance of real output under a flexible exchange ra.te regime exceeds the conditional variance of real output under a fixed rate regime whenever
Because the flexible exchange rate regime allows foreign price and interest rate disturbances and the domestic money supply disturbance to affect the exchange rate thereby altering the terms of trade, these disturbances add additional variance to the demand for and supply of real output under such a regime. A counterbalancing effect that tends to reduce the volatility of real output under flexible rates when compared to fixed rates is that positive real demand shocks appreciate the domestic currency thereby improving the terms of trade, and this change in relative prices reduces the demand for real output. The appreciation of the currency arises because the increase in real -11demand increases the demand for money. The smaller is the elasticity of the demand for money with respect to real output, y, the more likely is the volatility of real output to be greater under flexible exchange rates than under fixed rates. In order to provide a striking comparison in what follows, we assume that y = 0.
With this change, permanently flexible rates produce an unambiguously larger volatility of real output than permanently fixed exchange rates.
2C. SOLUTION FOR A TEMPORARY FIXED EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
Our fixed exchange rate solution from the previous section ignored the possibility that the economy may evolve into a state where it is worthwhile for agents to attack the government's foreign exchange reserves and end the fixed rate regime.4 We assume that the monetary authority will defend the fixed rate regime only until its reserves hit some known lower bound, r.
After reserves hit this bound, the netary authority is assumed to abandon the fixed-rate regime forever, If agents successfully attack the fixed-rate regime, they produce the floating rate whose level is given by
where .
[(1-ü) + czi* + (1+a)üi], and X through are as above except with y = 0. At time t-1, when setting nominal prices for period t, agents realize that the fixed exchange rate regime could collapse next period. Therefore, the conditional expectation of the exchange rate in period t is not simply s, but it is the probability weighted average of the conditional expectations under the two possible regimes:
where is the probability at time t-1 of an attack at time t and Ei (sIC) is the expectation at t-1 of s conditional on a collapse at time t.
The probability of an attack next period, is
where pr_i{x} is the probability of event x given the t-1 information set.
Examination of the solution for the flexible exchange rate in (12) 
-13which is clearly larger than Vt...1(yt)Fjx. It is also true that is less than Vt_1(yt)IF1ex In orderto determine this result, consider the following decomposition of the conditional variance of the exchange rate under the two regimes:
Expressions (15a) and (15b) 16) which is unambiguously positive since E 1(slC) > > This demonstrates that a regime of collapsing fixed rates has a more volatile real -14-output than a regime of permanently fixed rates, but the volatility is not larger than under a pure flexible rate regime.
These results are not particularly surprising since as cSi increases, The volatility of real output In this case is denoted 2-
In order to conduct an analytical comparison of (17) When is uniformly distributed, we have
where f() is the probability density function for the random variable
The unconditional expected value of c is zero and its unconditional variance is 1l2I3
It also follows that --'' -n
In the following discussion we will assumen n, since this is the region of interest.
If

> '
= 0, and cannot be less thansince this would make = 1 and would cause the collapse in period t-1.
In the Appendix we use (7) and (18) to find the conditional variance of output during a fixed-rate regime which may collapse. This expression is
-82[i(n -
+ -16 -
We also use (7) and (18) 
In Figure 1, (20a) and (20b) are plotted against t-r Expression (20b) is independent of i5 and it is the upper limit of (20a) as + -
The lower limit of (20b) as + r is a, which is output variance for a fixed rate regime without collapse. These results confirm what was found earlier for arbitrary probability distributions.
When 5t1 = n, an attack next period is unprofitable with probability one, so output variance is When = -Ti, an attack next period happens with probability one, so output variance is [82n2/3} + a. For values of between n and -n, output variance is a convex combination of the two extremes with weights that vary nonlinearly with
In our examination of these results, however, we asked what would happen to measured output variance during the fixed-rate regime as 5 changed but the regime did not collapse. The Appendix demonstrates that output variance during the fixed-rate regime would be given by
This quantity also depends on and is plotted in Figure 1 . The interesting feature of this line is that the maximum variance for output is above output variance for a permanent float. Indeed, the volatilities in 
Equation (21) states that the supply of real money balances, '' -is equal to the demand for theni, + u. To make the model analytically tractable, we simplified the money demand function, removing from the Flood-Marion model the opportunity cost of holding money as well as the portion of output that is responsive to prices. Money demand thus depends only on a constant, , and the productivity disturbance, ut. The qualitative properties of our results do not depend on these simplifications, but they enormously simplify some later calculations. Equation (22) gives the goods arbitrage condition, which is equivalent to prchasing power parity in this one-good model. Equation (23), which is derived in the Appendix of Flood and Marion, is the aggregate supply function. The variable z is proportional to one minus the optimal degree to which the nominal wage is indexed to the price level.
Since z is a deterministic linear function of the degree of indexing, the optimal wage contract may be found by minimizing the loss function (given below) with respect to z. Equation (24), which is also derived in the Appendix of Flood and Marion, gives the frictionless benchmark (no indexing) level of output, Equation (25) specifies that the money supply is composed of domestic credit, which we hold constant, and international reserves. As specified in equation (26), the foreign price follows a random walk. The disturbance terms, u and v have zero unconditional means and are mutually and serially uncorrelated. 
where Et_ixt is the mathematical expectation of x conditional on information from time t-1, which includes all variables dated t-1 and earlier as well as the structure of the model. The problem posed in (27) is to minimize a quadratic measure of deadweight loss by an appropriate choice of z.
By substituting from (23) and (24), the optimal indexing problem (27) where 0 A = 1p ( 1. The solution to (28) denoted z1 to reflect the possibility that it may depend on time t-1 information is = -ACi(p;ut)/Vti(p) (29) where Ct_i(•;) denotes the conditional covariance and Vi(.) denotes the conditional variance. Hence, the optimal value of z is z = A, and this value of z will set the Flex loss function to zero. This special result is due to the assumed absence of independent disturbances to the money supply or to money demand in this simplified version of the model. In general, the optimal z will depend on the relative sizes of the variances of the various shocks (see Flood and Marion, p. 54) . Presently, the important point is that ZIF1 is positive and time invariant.
When the exchange rate is permanently fixed, rt becomes demand determined, and the domestic price is given by p = p + s, where s is the fixed exchange rate. In this circumstance the domestic price prediction error, Pt -Et_IPt, is simply the prediction error of foreign prices, v.
Consequently, since v and Ut are uncorrelated, the solution to (29) is to set z1 = 0 to screen foreign price disturances out of the domestic loss function. This is exactly the resurt in Flood and Marion.
3C. SOLUTION FOR A TEMPORARY FIXED EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
The fixed-rate solution in the previous section presumed that the fixedrate regime would last forever. As before, however, for some configurations of the state variables of the economy it may be profitable for agents to attack the government?s stock of foreign exchange reserves and end the fixedrate regime. We continue to assume that the monetary authority will defend the fixed rate only until international reserves hit some known lower bound, r, and that after hitting this bound, the fixed-rate regime wiil be abandoned forever in favor of a flexible exchange rate regime. In this model, if agents attack the fixed rate, they will produce the floating rate given by
where + (1 -w). Thus, when forming wage contracts based on information available at time t-1, the contracting parties must plan for the possibility that the fixed-rate regime will be attacked successfully at time t. The probability of an attack taking place at t, based on t-1 information,
As before, when there is a possibility that the exchange rate regime will collapse, the agents take account of the possibility in determining their contractual relations. In this case, the optimal degree of indexing depends on the probability of the collapse because this affects the unconditional time t-1 covariance and variance in (29).
As is shown in the Appendix, the solution to (29) for this case is
where a * is the unconditional variance of v , and E (.Jc ) is the V t ti t expectation operator based on time t-1 information but conditional on a collapse taking place at t. The expression on the right hand side of (31), although complicated, is simply the covariance of Au and Pt conditional only on t-1 information divided by the variance of Pt conditional only on t-1 information.
In typical wage indexing models the optimal z is a time invariant function of the variances and covariances of the underlying disturbances. Our main point in this section is that it will not in general be time invariant -23when stochastic process switching is possible. This point can be seen at an intuitive level by examining (31) and noticing that z_1 depends on the state dependent probability at t-1 of an attack at t.
To make additional progress concerning z1, we again made specific assumptions about the probability distribution functions for v and u• In the Appendix we assume that the orthogonal disturbances v and u are each uniformly distributed on the interval [-n,rl] .
This assumption leads to the closed form but complicated expression for zi shown in the Appendix. Since the final expression for z_1 is so complicated, we simulated it for a few values of in the interval [-2n,O], and we set n = 1.
In this situation we found:
Example (32a) is the Flood-Marion result; when + -2, it is impossible for v + u to be less than '_ Consequently, t1 -0, and an attack on the fixed-rate regime at time t is impossible because it cannot be profitable. It is thus optimal to set = 0 (index wages fully), thereby screening all foreign disturbances out of the loss function. For larger values of such as -1 and 0 in examples 32b) and (32c), an attack is possible and contracts written at t-1 allow for this contingency by setting at optimal values between 0, the optimal value for a fixed exchange rate with no attack possible, and X, the optimal value for a permanently floating exchange rate.
-24-
The point of this simple example is to note that an economy's optimal choice of wage indexation to the price level may not depend simply on the 
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to examine how some aspects of the real economy, such as the determination of output, relative prices and real wages, are influenced by the potential collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime. We examined the implications of the potential switch in government policies in simple versions of two popular international macroeconomic models. In both models, agents must take an action that predetermines some nominal variable.
Consequently, monetary policy and the choice of exchange rate regime have real effects. In both models the monetary authority Is only willing to defend its exchange rate until its reserves hit a known lower bound. In each case the monetary authority also conducts an exogenous domestic credit policy. If the authorities were willing to conduct an endogenous domestic credit policy, there would be no need for internatioa1 reserves, and the probability of collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime would be zero.
Clearly, one interesting area for future work is the linkage of the domestic credit policy and the constraints imposed by the government budget a -25constraint with the choice of exchange rate regime. Eaton (1984) has investigated this problem in a neoclassical context with exogenous real output.
Another interesting area for future work is to focus on devaluations as opposed to the switch from fixed to flexible rates investigated here. What determines the timing and magnitude of a devaluation? Blanco and Garber (1984) have begun such an investigation. Subtracting (A2) from (Al) gives ) where Vi(sC) is the time t-1 conditional variance given no collapse at t. Expression (A3) is (16) The disturbance u is uncorrelated with , and it is trivially uncorrelated with s. Therefore,
where is the unconditonal variance of u. Our problem then is to find
where = pr( > = -)/2n, and Et_ist (1 _1)s + Using this information and recognizing that NCt implies s =s and C implies s = in (A5) we derive
In the text is given by equation (12). Therefore The second term in (A6) contains Ei[(s -')2ICt], which' is
Use (A8) and (A9) in (A6) to obtain -Eis)2] = _1(h/4)[nt-12 
which is equation (20c) in the text.
All. PROPRTIES OF FIGURE 1
The curve labeled (20a) in Figure 1 The two curves intersect when real solutions for t-1 obtained by setting (20a) equal to (20c) lie in the range -
A3. RESULTS FOR SECTION 3
In this section we derive the optimal z for the collapsing fixed rate regime. The general solution of (28) is = -ACi[p;uJ/Vti(pt).
We first work on the term in the numerator of A(13). When a speculative attack is possible, the expected pre level reflects the probability of the attack, 
Since E_i(uv) = (1 -+ iT_iE_i(uvjC) = 0, and
which is used in the numerator of text equation (31).
For later calculations it is useful to recall from the text that
We turn now to the expression in the denominator of A(13). A derivation similar to that above gives
It will prove useful to expand some of the terms on the right hand side of (A19). In particular, consider the following terms: In order to make further progress on these expressions we assumed Ut and v to be uniformly and independently distributed on the interval [-n, n].
In the calculations reported here, we impose the additional assumption that -2n < y_ ( 0.
We impose this additional restriction because the joint distribution of (u, v) conditional on u + v < t-1 is quite complicated when > 0, and we need only examine a few different values of to establish the point that z,_1 will be time varying. Also, when < -2n, the probability of a collapse is zero.
-
The following results are a few basic facts concerning the joint conditional distribution of Ut and Vt: where, for -•2n < o is given in (A21e), is given in (A21d),
The simulations reported in the text used n = 1 and = -2, -1, 0.
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FOOTNOTES
1Early contributions to the debate on fixed versus flexible exchange rates are surveyed by Ishiyama (1975) and Tower and Willett (1976) . Some of the more recent analytical contributions to this area that are based on rational expectations include Flood (1979) , Lapan and Enders (1980) , Helpnian (1981) , Weber (1981) , Eaton (1982) , Kimbrough (1983 ), Turnovsky (1983 , and Aizenman and Frenkel (1984) .
2Fischer (1982) demonstrates that seignorage accounts for as much as ten percent of total government revenue for countries such as Argentina and
Brazil. The literature on the monetary approach to the balance of payments, e.g. Frenkel and Johnson (1975) , was quite clear that a policy of fixing the exchange rate made the total money supply endogenous. 4Although we examine only fixed and freely floating exchange rates, our methods could easily encompass "crawling pegs" or any rule that makes the fixed exchange rate a deterministic function of the previous state. Our methods could also be extended to analyze a "dirty float" of the form mi = + v, such as that studied by Aizenman and Frenkel (1984) . In such a circumstance, while the private sector could not attack the money printing rule, the fiscal authority might require a change in the rule if it were to call for less money printing than were required for deficit finance. The inability of Southern Cone countries to stay on preannounced crawling peg schedules is perhaps an example of the type of fiscal authority attack we have in mind. In such countries an exchange rate policy seems not to be permanently viable unless it accomodates the fiscal authority's revenue requirements.
-36 -5'rhe conditions we use for an attack are those in Flood and Garber (1984) . An alternative view, where the agents who would attack the price fixing scheme are small and disorganized is proposed by Obstfeld (1984) .
According to the Obstfeld view, s > s is necessary for an attack but not always sufficient. The condition is necessary and sufficient in the present model though, as Obstfeld (1984) has shown.
6lndexing wages to prices is motivated only by the large number of such contracts actually implemented. The value of the loss function can generally be made smaller if contracts include more complex indexing to the state as in Karni (1983) or Aizenman and Frenkel (1984) . Our intent, however, is not to specify an ideal contract, but rather to indicate how actual contracts affect the economy in a second best environment.
7Cecchetti ( manufacturing. The movement in the parameter may be due to movement in the conditional variance of the exogenous monetary and real processes of the economy, but the analysis in this paper suggests that such movement might also arise from agents' perceptions of the likelihood of switches in government policies. Since the contracting paradigm also leads to the aggregate supply curve studied by Lucas (1973) , the perceived impermanence of existing exchange rate regimes is an additional reason why the slope parameters would differ across countries.
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